Specifically, the question arose as to whether a deposit agreement constituted an “injurious” interest, thus giving rise to Rule 3-300 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. The sisters also argued that the eventual tax was not refundable, since the eventual agreement had not been previously approved by the estate court, in accordance with sections 2644 and 10811(c) of the Estate Act. This was not found to be persuasive since these provisions applied only to a fee agreement concluded for the benefit of the half-brother`s estate; Here was the agreement in favor of the sisters, so that they could become or remain beneficiaries of the succession. Compliance with these provisions of the inheritance law was not necessary. For example, to Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 904, a dismissed worker, hired a lawyer on the basis of occasional fees to represent her in a complaint against her former employer. (Id. pp. 910-911.) When the lawsuit ended with a judgment unfavourable to the employee, the lawyer agreed to represent her on appeal, provided that she accept any offer of a settlement of at least 150,000 $US.
(Id. on page 910-912.) The Court of Appeal concluded that this limitation of the client`s power to settle the remedy was valid and enforceable because it encouraged a comparison for an adequate estimate of the value of the worker`s rights while respecting the lawyer`s right to compensation and the lawyer did not exploit the client unfairly in negotiating the limitation. (Id. on s. 917–918.) Without analyzing the 3-300 factors rule that go beyond fairness to the client, the court said: “We cannot fault a lawyer who has made or expects to pursue a case under a possible fee agreement, that he fears that the client will refuse an appropriate transaction offer. Such a refusal risks that the client, and therefore the lawyer, will ultimately recover nothing and withdraw from his own pocket the legal costs incurred. (Id. at p. 918.) The reason was related to the nature of SJMs that cannot be used to actually decide instead of deciding if there is a critical issue for the process. Although the client`s statement served to shift the burden of presenting evidence to the contrary to the applicant`s lawyer, the applicant presents evidence in the form of another statement from her former legal assistant, in which she stated that she had signed a second retention agreement in her presence. . . .